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Abstract: The goal of this article is dual: first, introducing a new model of accident named STAMP (systems-theoretic accident 
modeling and processes); then applying the model to an innovative process for the treatment of contaminated substances and the 
re-use of treated substances. This article is a demonstration for a need of a new tool to take into account hazards and safety within 
socio-technical systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Processes for remediation (removal of pollution or 
contaminants) of contaminated sediments have 
become very efficient. These technologies, which are 
particularly complex, call for a comprehensive 
approach to risk analysis which characterises all 
threats (to humans, equipment, local residents, the 
environment etc.). The STAMP (systems-theoretic 
accident model and processes) accident model is an 
example of such a comprehensive approach, and it has 
been chosen to characterise the risks associated with 
Novosol®, an innovative remediation process. Risk 
analysis is carried out through the application of 
STPA (STamP-based Analysis).  
This following presentation is organised into four 
sections. The first describes the Novosol® process for 
treating contaminated sediments. The second 
introduces the STAMP accident model, together with 
the associated technique STPA (which can be used 
both to evaluate safety and to perform accident 
analysis). The third section describes the concrete 
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application of the STPA technique to the Novosol® 
process. The fourth section is the conclusion. 
2. The Problem of Contaminated Sediments 
and the Novosol® Process 
The natural environment is subject to many forms 
of industrial, urban and agricultural waste, which 
create a rich and diverse sediment contaminant. 
Solvay SA began development of Novosol® in 
partnership with the Université Libre de Bruxelles [1, 
2] in 1993. It was initially developed to treat airborne 
ash resulting from incineration. From 1999, it was 
applied to the treatment of a wide range of 
contaminated sediments.  
Novosol® is divided into two stages [3]: a stage of 
phosphatation, which aims to stabilize the heavy 
metals present in the sediment, followed by a stage of 
calcination, which destroys organic matter and 
provides reusable materials.  
This technology, which brings together many 
stakeholders, creates a high level of risk which must be 
controlled. Control is achieved through the application 
of a risk analysis technique known as STPA. STPA is 
based on the STAMP systemic accident model which 
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advocates that the socio-technical system be considered 
in its entirety [4, 5]. 
3. The STAMP Model and the STPA 
Technique 
STPA is based on the three concepts just described, 
and can be used for safety assessments or accident 
analysis. It is implemented in three main phases 
described below: 
 Phase 1: defines the safety requirements of the 
system. It is divided into two sub-phases. The first 
sub-phase defines requirements in terms of safety. The 
second establishes the safety control structure, which 
defines the roles and responsibilities of system 
components, and aims to identify all interactions 
between them; 
 Phase 2: integrates the safety requirements of the 
system, in the form of safety constraints, at each 
hierarchical level in the structure; 
 Phase 3: process models (control loops) are 
formalised. This is in order to identify any weak 
controls which may lead to the violation of a security 
constraint, and consequently a state in which an 
accident can occur. The controls and constraints 
defined in Phase 2 are potentially subject to violations 
arising from the process models and control loops 
inherent at each level of the structure. Consequently, 
the objective of this third phase is to determine at 
which level of the process model, and where in the 
control loop, there are weaknesses which may cause 
the violation of a constraint. Constraint violations can 
make the system shift towards a state where an 
accident may happen. 
4. Application of the STPA Technique to 
Novosol® 
Each of the stages of the STPA methodology is now 
reviewed and applied to Novosol® [5]: 
 Phase 3.1: definition of system requirements with 
respect to safety and control structures 
Using the STPA method, the requirements and the 
“system” constraints of Novosol® are defined in the 
first sub-phase. Table 1 shows the requirements and 
constraints for businesses currently using Novosol® 
(comprising Solvay SA during development, and 
currently SEDISOL and SIFA). 
The cornerstone of this sub-phase is to define and to 
establish the control structure for system safety, as 
described by Leveson [6, 7]. Using the definition of 
requirements and constraints from the first sub-phase, 
a hierarchical control structure can be created (Fig. 1) 
which includes a definition of the roles and 
responsibilities of each component—in terms of both 
control and feedback. 
The analysis provides an overview of the system, 
and highlights interactions between the hierarchical 
levels. Using this structure, roles and 
responsibilities are integrated, and it becomes easier 
to determine the influence components have on each 
other. Establishing roles and responsibilities support 
the following phase: the definition and integration 
of constraints, at the level of each structural 
component.  
 Phase 3.2: integration of system requirements at 
each level of the hierarchy, in the form of safety 
constraints 
This second phase depends on the first. It aims to 
integrate requirements and safety constraints, with 
respect to the various interactions between 
components, at each hierarchical level. Requirements 
are defined, and then applied (in the form of safety 
constraints) to the interactions between components of 
the safety control structure (identified in Phase 1). 
Constraints must be analysed in detail. It is at this 
point that inadequate constraints, which could play a 
role in creating an accident, are identified.  
The result of this analysis translates into the 
definition of inadequate, or (in the framework of a 
security assessment) potential control measures. 
Inadequate controls are identified at each hierarchical 
level, which correspond to the interactions identified 
when the control structure was prepared (Table 2). 
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Table 1  Examples of requirements definition and constraints for businesses operating Novosol®. 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
Safety requirements and constraints 
Treatment of sediments contaminated by organic compounds and heavy metals 
Responsible for the smooth conduct of inspections and preparation of reports on the use and development of Novosol® in 
consultation with national and international bodies 
Responsible for defining requirements and the operational performance of Novosol® with respect to national and international 
regulations  
 
 
Fig. 1  An analysis of novosol® using the stpa technique, the structure takes into account the development and operation of 
novosol®, and shows the interactions between hierarchical levels [5, 8]. 
 
Table 2  Inadequate control mechanisms for businesses using Novosol®. 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
Potential or inadequate control measures 
The operating company does not meet operational requirements for the safe use of Novosol® 
The operating company is not able to meet the requirements of the company responsible for the development of Novosol® 
The operating company does not provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies  
 
Inadequate control mechanisms are translated into 
constraints and safety requirements then integrated at 
the level of the system component (Table 3).  
Phase 3.3: Analysis of the process models (control 
loops (Fig. 2)) to identify weaknesses in control that 
could lead to the violation of a safety constraint and 
therefore a state where an accident could occur 
The constraints defined in Phase 2 can be violated, 
and shift the system towards a dangerous state where 
an accident may occur. The objective in Phase 3 is to 
determine where in the control loop (or loops) a 
weakness (or weaknesses) may surface, as it is these 
weaknesses which lead to inadequate controls and 
change the state of the system. 
As an example, Fig. 3 describes the “maintenance 
and evolution” control loop of the system. 
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Table 3  Potential constraints for businesses using Novosol®. 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
(Potential) constraints 
The operating company must be able to meet safe operating requirements 
The operating company must be able to meet the developmental requirements of Novosol® 
The operating company must provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies 
 
 
Fig. 2  Defects in the control loop, finding weaknesses in a control loop enables inadequate control actions to be identified. 
 
 
Fig. 3  The “maintenance and evolution” control loop of Novosol®, this loop integrates the various components which 
interact with the process model at a particular level, it highlights interactions at various hierarchical levels.  
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5. Conclusions 
The STPA technique, based on the STAMP model, 
allows to consider a system throughout its life-cycle, 
taking into account all possible interactions. It focuses 
not on a chain of events, but on the problem of control 
between different hierarchical levels of the system. 
The clear advantage of its application to Novosol® is 
that it is possible to establish an overall view of the 
system, and not simply to focus on the technical 
process. This generates an optimisation of both the 
treatment process, and the safety and performance of 
the system as a whole.  
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